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Marx-Shalin Exchange on the Goffman Project 
 
 
The following email exchange between Dmitri Shalin and Gary T. Marx, Professor Emeritus of sociology, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, took place between August 27, 2008, and October 16, 2008.  The 
exchange was occasioned by Shalin’s paper “Goffman’s Biography and Interaction Order:  A Study in 
Biocritical Hermeneutics.” The original text is in black, Marx’s comments are marked red, and Shalin’s 




This paper examines the interfaces between Erving Goffman’s biography and 
theory.  It rests on the premise that Goffman’s Behavior in Public Places can 
be profitably explored in light of Goffman’s behavior in public places, and vice 
versa. 
Nice link!  Also think a bit about what and why he withheld, he wasn’t like 
some of the others of the 60s generation a decade his juniors, who, as 
Berkeley teachers (and in soc. departments more broadly) let it all hang out 
and tried to be your buddies etc.  
 
Apparently Goffman found the 1960s bothersome, especially as the spirit of 
the age transformed the Berkeley scene.  You would think that the rule 
breaking and acting out should have fascinated him, yet he seemed to be put 
off by all the hustle and bustle. 
 
You can find something of interest, intriguing yet not value it or want to be 
associated with it. 
 
The tentative conclusion I have reached after examining available biographical 
accounts is that Goffman was a student of civility whose standards he flouted, 
that his demeanor was sometimes intentionally demeaning, his deference 
willfully deferred, and his incivility painfully obvious to those present.  The 
argument is made that Goffman’s infringements on the interaction order were 
strategic, systematic, theoretically significant, and worthy of close study by 
interactionist sociologists. 
Beyond infringing, he also used it to manipulate scenes such as standing up at 
his desk when he was done with you.  In a way that was gentle and honorific, 
I think when I was done with students I simply was more direct and maybe 
that was hurtful.  I would say things like, I have some stuff I have to do so I 
can’t talk any further.  Knowing how to send and read the cues can offer a 
sense of power beyond any psychol fun and games. This also makes role 
distance possible (even if sometimes only the one showing it is aware of it). –a 
kind of hidden last laugh. 
No, I think the standing up to get you to leave, or walking toward the door are 
manipulative and indirect, at least relative to saying, “I can’t talk anymore.”  
 
In standing up he demonstrates his awareness of the culture with respect to 
what that means and of the implied status difference in which the more 
dominant is more likely to initiate or end encounters. Maybe it is also the 
subtlety we appreciate and take as a sign of intelligence or sophistication.  
Opening and closing rituals could be unnerving for all the parties involved.  I 
am not sure if Goffman’s habits in this context could be called 
“manipulative.”  This is one of the cases when different accounts and 
evaluations might shed light on the etiquette and conventions of the era. 
They can also be re-assuring as comfortable rituals.  
2. 
Exploratory in nature, this study is designed to make the case for biocritical 
hermeneutics 
I know why we use such terms, but this one is the kind that non-scholars 
would scoff at --is there a simpler term? Why not just biography?– 
an offshoot of pragmatist sociology that focuses on the embodied social forms 
and biographical underpinnings of sociological inquiry (Shalin 2007).   
The term should not be too jarring for a professional ear, but it can put off 
general readers.  “I also use “biocritique” and “biocritical study,” but that 
might not be much of an improvement.  
Better I agree but still conjures up images of the body,  biology and pharmacy 
and bodies and draws attention away from the social. Also not sure what the 
“critique”, or “critical” add. Any good scholarship will be critical as in 
independent, but need not be critical as in negative, or getting at the 
presumed real stuff that is hidden by self-promoters. 
It uses the resources of the Intercyberlibrary (see the reference section for 
URL), an online collection highlighting the works and avocational pursuits of 
interactionist sociologists.  The library houses The Erving Goffman Project that 
features biographical materials on Goffman and promotes biographical 
methods in social science.  
A lot of the materials there have nothing to do with Goffman per se, although 
may be broadly within areas he was concerned with. As such it is as much a 
genealogy of such work much beyond Goffman or biographical methods. 
The International Biography Initiative site has dozens of articles on 
biographical methods in social science, some of them are first rate.  Yet, most 
of those are in Russian.  There is much interest in biographical research in 
contemporary Russian sociology.  The Intercyberlibrary that houses the Erving 
Goffman Project serves as an online resource for the SI community.  I hope to 
add there a selection of papers in English that deals with biomethods in 
sociology. 
3. 
The problem with self-construction is that it is subject to self-sampling error 
inherent in sampling by anecdote and validation through hearsay. 
 
Is there a corrective for this?  Are all self samples equally suspect, what are 
the means for more and less representative samples? Also, if you qualify it and 
notes its limits, does that let one off the hook?    
The problem is similar in some respects (but dissimilar in other) to the 
sampling concerns in sociological research.  We need to reckon with the 
possibility of oversampling some events and undersampling other.  Things 
must be rendered “accountable” before we can be “counted” – before they 
count.  Once we have opreationalized definitions, explained how to identify in 
situ an instance of each kind, we have to figure out which events of the 
designated kind are more or less prevalent.  I am trying to problematize the 
very process that converts a flesh and blood event into a narrative fact, for our 
accounting practices are implicated in the accounts we render and the hard 
numbers based on these counted accounts.  When we cover biofacts, we need 
to make room for singularity, but that does not preclude the search for 
patterns, even if these are patterns of indeterminacy.  If I preach 
environmentalism but refuse to recycle my garbage, or pride myself on being 
calm under pressure yet blow my top from time to time, I display a 
nonidentity that must enter a biocritical account.  How best to match our 
behavioral indicators, verbal symbols, and emotional indexes is the question 
involved in self-sampling.   
I think we can also get unduly hung up on issues of sampling as 
representative. At least two meanings here –first is this common, second if 
uncommon is it none-the-less representative or typical of these uncommon 
events when they do occur? Of course their vary distinctiveness may mean 
that they stand alone. But they are no less interesting as a result. 
 
Present in all biographical narratives, this difficulty is particularly evident in 
autobiographical reconstructions whose protagonists rummage through their 
own lives looking for episodes that express the author’s evolving sense of 
agency.  The reader is usually left uncertain as to how representative a given 
sample of anecdotes is, how the incongruent strands of enselfments hang 
together and whether they form a coherent whole.  
4. 
Rather, biocritical hermeneutics focuses on the patterns of uncertainty and 
structures of indeterminacy manifest in human conduct continuously adjusted 
to social pressures and revealing human agency as the inexorably stochastic 
process (Shalin 1986:22).  An observation by Michel Montaigne, who explored 
his own life in a series of brilliant essays conceived as quasi-experiments, 
illuminates this perspective human agency:  
5.  
Biocritical investigation starts with the premise that we gain knowledge about 
ourselves and society when we examine systematically the (mis)alignment 
between our words, actions, and emotions, along with the work done to 
realign our word-body-action nexus.  
Isn’t this deviant case analysis of a sort?  Several sorts of activity you note, 
but also efforts to misalign them when they would fit and to make them fit 
when they shouldn’t. 
It is impossible to decide without knowing the context.  On many occasions 
holding back one’s honest opinion and stifling one’s immediate reactions is a 
good form, as is withholding information to protect third parties and going 
back on one’s promise extracted under duress.  Legal codes, etiquette books, 
and common sense offer guidelines on when such performances turn deviant, 
but it is a good idea to examine the context before we judge the matter.    
Biocritical research relies on a kind of “reverse editing” that restores the 
redacted enselfments and reframes the overall self-construction by cross-
referencing the agent’s programmatic commitments with the available 
biographical records of their actions, feelings, and words. 
Great kind of like those inserts and deletions that can be brought back by a 
computer command indicating when and by whom a change was made -- but 
a bit more difficult!   
One more ethical guideline to add to the list of principles governing biocritical 
research is this:  Anyone condemning a certain practice or committing publicly 
to a moral principle invites scrutiny of one’s verbal and nonverbal conduct.  It 
is fair to explore Senator Larry Craig’s peculiar behavior in an airport bathroom 
after he publicly declared his opposition to gay marriage and made derogatory 
statements about gay lifestyle. This is in contrast with a situation where he 
said nothing or come out in support. 
By collecting biographical data and subjecting it to biocritical 
Again the biocritical doesn’t set well as I noted above. Could just call 
biographical analysis which involves the social, personal, cultural and historical 
contexts – factors which the subject may or may not have been aware of or 
treated openly. 
analysis, we can better understand how affectively ambivalent and 
situationally ambiguous occasions are framed into ready-to-hand accounts 
which, in turn, feed back into our conduct and emotion work.   
6.  
Epistemologically, biocritical hermeneutics takes its cue from early Heidegger 
who stressed the link between our moods and theoretical practices.  “It is 
precisely when we see the ‘world’ unsteady and fitfully in accordance with our 
moods, that the ready-to-hand shows itself in its specific moodhood, which is 
never the same from day to day. . . .  Yet even the purest theoria has not left 
all moods behind it. . . .  Indeed from the ontological point of view we must as 
a general principle leave the primary discovery of the world to ‘bare moods’” 
(1962:177).  
Yes but there is some consistency in moodhood and that matters in contexts 
where it is found (in contrast say to feelings about an overplayed popular song 
that is out of fashion and even arouses negative moods now) 
It would be hard indeed to build an ontology of beings and moods following 
Heidegger’s suggestions.  His Being and Time can be seen as a valiant 
attempt, but the range of moods and emotions covered in his book is 
exceedingly narrow.  The same can be said about Goffman who is fixated on 
embarrassment and more or less ignores other affective states.   
This bold premise calls for a reexamination of the link between affect and 
discursive practices.  It also invites a fresh look at the hermeneutical circle 
which, as Heidegger (1962:195) warned us, “is not to be reduced to the level 
of vicious circle, or even of a circle which is merely tolerated, [for in this] circle 
is hidden a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing.”  I take 
this to mean that, consciously or unconsciously, we insert ourselves into the 
hermeneutical circle and bring our affections and deeds into a social inquiry 
(Shalin 2007:220-221).  Our theoretical constructs draw on the somatic-
affective experience we bring to the research situation, just as the experiences 
gleaned from the situation under study brings about reconstruction in our 
experience.   
Yes but key issue is whether there are some universals here re intuition, 
archtypes etc, tricky stuff but is certainly worth thinking about, that is why 
biology can be so important as one aspect of understanding society, even as it 
is unpopular among many of our colleagues.  I have added intuition (which no 
doubt has as a major source what you suggest but may also be something 
deeper across species –work on what is beautiful across cultures, the smile, 
light as good etc.). 
Intuition is a big word, covering all manners of things.  We fall back on the 
intuition when something – a deal, proposition, or self-presentation – seems 
too good to be true.  We eagerly search for signs to substantiate our intuition, 
remaining uneasy until we succeed in rationalizing our suspicions.   
Not sure about too good to be true, although that is one strand. For me 
intuition is a feeling or belief that can’t be conventionally accounted for within 
our logical and empirical ways of reasoning. 
7. 
Goffman’s methodological stance echoes this agenda.  We can see that in a 
talk that Goffman (2002) gave at the 1974 Pacific Sociological Association 
meeting where he described participant observation as a way of “getting data . 
. . by subjecting yourself, your own body and your own personality, and your 
own social situation, to the set of contingencies that play upon a set of 
individuals, so that you can physically and ecologically penetrate their circle of 
response to their social situation, or their work situation, or their ethnic 
situation, or whatever. . . .  That ‘tunes your body up’ and with your ‘tuned-up 
body’ and with the ecological right to be close to them (which you obtained by 
one sneaky means or another), you are in a position to note their gestural, 
visual, bodily response to what’s going on about them and you are empathetic 
enough because you have been taking the same crap they were taking – to 
sense what it is that they’re responding to” (Goffman 2002:125-126).  
 
Great quote, you might even start with this.  It also works the other way -- to 
share insights about the joy re things you have taken delight in.  Some of my 
writing about the professional side of the profession is about the thrill felt in 
succeeding, as well as the disappointment and sometimes anger, felt in 
failing.  Need to separate these, author and maybe his/her analysts need to 
talk about kinds of affective influences beyond the negative, also is probably a 
neutral category.   
8.  
Having being drawn into the pragmatically understood hermeneutical circle, 
the biocritic will face a host of ethical challenges.  Which information about the 
researcher’s private life should remain private and which belongs to public 
domain?  What if a scholar under biocritical scrutiny made special effort – as 
Erving Goffman did – to insulate his or her backstage from public scrutiny? 
Also what about the former that may be more revealing rather than 
concealing? – subjects who spill themselves all over the pages, as unseemly as 
this can be, it seems increasingly a characteristic of our media video 
culture.  A nice variable across all kinds of things is how clearly offered the 
backpage stuff is across fields, time periods etc.  There also are good leakage 
issues that Goffman wrote about.  Even when the subject-author tries to 
protect it, it can often be inferred from expressions etc.  One of the things I 
most admired about Goffman and took from him was subtly, and speaking in 
code so that the hip (or the learned and smart on your wave length) will know 
what you are saying -- because of double entendre cleverness, analogies, 
esoteric references etc, or what was not said. In that sense he let a lot out. His 
humor is a case in point. It was often biting, sarcastic and clearly was a way of 
kind of showing your aces without quite doing that. He was not directly 
judgmental re current events or persons and preferred to make more 
categorical points about persons with privilege. That quote at the end of his 
last paper about if we need warrant to speak, do so on behalf of those without 
official voices applies well. While I resonated with that emotionally, empirically 
it can smack of cultural colonialism, as well as the need to critically 
examine allperspectives, even as we are aware of the hidden and not so 
hidden hands of stratification. 
I am intrigued by today’s youngsters who are eager to post personal info on 
YouTube, Facebook, and similar networking vehicles.  It is amazing what one 
can find posted on the web about the dates, colleagues, bosses. . . .  The 
standards are evolving rapidly in this area, as the etiquette books are 
rewritten and the meaning of selfhood and privacy continues to evolve.  I 
appreciate your insights into Goffman’s manners and the meaning encoded in 
his actions.  It would be hard for me to latch onto some of that stuff and 
understand its socio-cultural context.  
 9. 
“Goffman was very secretive about his personal life,” Fine, Manning, and 
Smith (2000:x) remind us in their extensive review of Goffman’s 
work.   “[T]he executor of Goffman’s estate, abiding by his wishes, has closed 
his personal records to those who would investigate his life,” confirms Jaworski 
(2000:299).  Yves Winkin, a sociologist who made a concerted effort to study 
Goffman’s biography, corroborates this point:  “In Goffman’s case, it was clear 
that his privacy was jealously guarded.  He never gave interviews to the 
media, he never allowed his publishers to release pictures of him and he never 
appeared on television.  In November 1983, when I approached Gillian 
Sankoff, his widow and literary executor, I was politely acknowledged but was 
given no overt help (such as access to the archives). . . .  As Gillian Sankoff 
explained to me, Goffman wanted to keep his life totally separate from his 
work” (Winkin 1999:19-20).  But can a scholar really keep one’s life 
completely separate from one’s work?   
 
That contrast is really interesting given how much he generalized from his own 
personal experiences, perceptions and sense of things as a bedrock method – 
at least when starting. It also contrasts with the 60s communal, share it ethos 
and the role of reciprocity in human solidarity and the tilt toward authenticity. 
It also is a status differentiating thing. 
 
This really needs explaining!  There is (or should be) a literature on wills, 
instructions to executors, things to be opened only upon death. A variety of 
reasons for posthumous offerings or withholdings and that needs to be 
connected to degree of revelation etc. during the person’s life. Beyond 
strategic reasons for holding back, there may also be effort to create some 
mystery, playfulness in teasing an audience in hinting or withholding while 
alive, a type of manipulation known to advertisers, but that wouldn’t hold for 
after death.  Holding back is also a form of power (the sociology of information 
and the secret are relevant here ala Simmel) as it touches such things) but 
then it only works if you let it slip sometimes so others know there is a 
secret.  It may also speak to his seriousness about being what he called a 
“student” in which we have this glorious trek to knowledge and what matters 
is the project not the person.   
 
I am thinking how Simmel’s interest in secrecy might have implicated his own 
life, his very personal need for secrecy.  That is the issue implicating 
biocritique.  One has to consider the danger of reductionism here, but also be 
aware of a potential for serious exploration.  It is hard to believe that Simmel 
theorized secrecy without drawing on his own experience.  He talks about the 
situations where “the guilty one alone knows the fault,” about “a fault against 
the other of which both are conscious,” “a considerateness, a delicacy, a secret 
wish to make up for it, a yieldingness and selflessness, none of which would 
ever occur to him had he a completely untroubled conscience.”  These 
observations come from a man maintaining vigorous social intercourse, 
managing a wife and a mistress, having a child that would be raised by both, 
and so much more.  An urbane man par excellence, Simmel traveled in many 
circles and fully enjoyed what the partially overlapping networks, ample 
financial resources, and his celebrity status had to offer.   
 
Also I don’t know, but imagine some of documents from a will or estate are 
public and something might be learned there, but this as you note, gets 
delicate even it is legal to rummage around.  I think a lot about the interplay 
of public and private and different meanings of these.  Part of it is being able 
to see and morally and mentally order the public in the private and the 
reverse. 
 
What do you think he meant in dedicating one of his books to Radcliffe-Brown 
who he almost met?  That in a sense is personal, but in a peculiar way. What 
doesn’t happen to us is rarely made much of. Why does he inject himself 
here?  Why not in other places? 
 
Yet, I was unable so far to track the statement he made on the subject.  I 
suspect that Goffman saw a kindred spirit in Radcliff-Brown, a fellow 
ethnographer, a master craftsman, even though the kind of ethnography each 
man did could not be more different. 
 
In the past, Gillian turned down requests for interviews (I understand that her 
daughter is equally uninterested and have no idea what the situation with his 
son is).  I would not want to bother her with my inquiries.  As for the reasons 
behind Goffman’s decision to seal his archives, I wish I knew more 
details.  Most published info appears to be second-hand; the gist of it is that 
Erving wanted to separate his life and work.  The exact wording of his will, 
formal or informal, is important.   
 
The case was made to me on occasion by those who knew Goffman personally 
that his work stands or falls on its own, that in-depth knowledge of his 
personal life cannot help us build on Goffman’s insights and carry on his 
sociological tradition.  Moreover, interest in the scholar’s personal life risks 
turning prurient. 
 
This ain’t necessarily bad, if some broader points lie there, it may be a 
necessary cost, also gives realism to us as humans and can make more 
interesting to read. The issue is prurience for its own sake does not belong in 
this type of work.  
 
I think so too, but many enough disagree.  I hope that once the scholarly 
dimension of the Goffman project becomes clear, more people agree to share 
memories or offer comments/corrections.  The thing I particularly value in 
your comments is that they help me understand Erving’s humanity – 
something I want to explore and celebrate – without glossing over the rough 




In the same spirit, P.S. Strong lists several lessons Goffman bequeathed to us, 
one of which bears on the propriety of treating the researcher’s life as a 
resource:  “[Y]ou can treat your own life as data.  Each one of us is a natural 
control group; if our splendidly universal theories don’t even apply to our own 
lives, there must be something wrong with them. . . .  To treat one’s entire life 
as data is at one and the same time to dedicate oneself entirely to the 
discipline; to relentlessly combat ‘that touching tendency to keep a part of the 
world safe from sociology’ and to treat the whole life, including sociology, its 
works and homilies, as a resource for intellectual exploration” (Strong 
2000:42, 41).  
 
Yes but depends on the kind of issue or question one is concerned with, 
dangers of over-generalizing. Also I recall his wonderful remark about how 
“it’s all data.” That applies to what is offered apart from its logical, empirical or 
moral adequacy but also to that which is not revealed. Such data more clearly 
takes on meaning when contrasted to related settings where it is revealed by 
others. Is hard to see non-events however. But an aspect of imagination is 
identifying them. Imputing motives for withholding is also even harder absent 
a confession or an informer. 
 
Biocritical hermeneutics raises the issue of autobiocritique.  Those interested 
in other peoples’ archives ought to be ready to open up their own.  I am 
troubled by the fact that the founder of “archeology of knowledge” destroyed 
his archives before his death, and the great explorer of “society’s backstage” 
refused to lift the curtain on his private existence.  We own our archives and 
can dispose of them as we see fit, but we do not own our reputations and have 




As co-director of the International Biography Initiative (see the reference 
section for URL), I grapple with such issues when I prepare for publication 
interviews recorded over the course of years with Russian social scientists and 
intellectuals.  Even when respondents gave every indication that their 
interviews or memoirs should enter the public domain, the question persists 
whether frank opinions and intimate details that surface in their narratives 
should be kept away from the public. 
 
Yes, but need to stay on guard against being manipulated or ask it is for a 
good cause?  
 
I thought I would find clear guidelines articulated by historians, biographers, 
and archivists on how best to handle private information but discovered that 
this was not at all the case.  Much needs to be done to clarify this murky 
domain.  Recently, I have learned (from Carolyn Ellis and Kathy Charmaz in 
particular) about the lively debate on this subject among ethnographers.  The 
issues of autoethnography and co-constructed narratives are of particular 
interest in this respect. 
 
Those compiling an autobiography confront a similar set of narrative problems 
and ethical dilemmas.  Which biographical materials are to be redacted, how 
closely the edited truth must resemble messy realities, when the account 
offered to the public becomes self-serving, what is the proper balance of tact 
and frankness, of an overarching narrative unity and jarring self-
revelations?  Interviews and memoirs posted on the International Biography 
Initiative site are highly illuminating in this respect.  They show that Russian 
scholars seeking to reconcile their perestroika selves with their earlier soviet 
incarnations sometime willfully omit key events that cast their past identities 
and subsequent metamorphoses in more ambiguous light (Shalin 2006, 
2008).  
 
Good acknowledge the tensions; have you read The File by Ash-Garner, very 
relevant for these issues! The film The Lives of Others is relevant here as well. 
 
Have not read “The File” but saw the movie ‘Lives of Others” – a powerful 
statement indeed.  I found it to be more effective as a political testimony than 
artwork.  Conversations with Russian sociologists and public intellectuals I 
have been conducting over the course of years address many of the issues 




Ives Winkin (1999:20) asks, “[D]o I have the right to invade his [Goffman’s] 
privacy?”  The answer is “yes,” provided the researcher is “well-intentioned as 
good literary standards permit.  There should be no stature crafting, but 
equally there should be no unnecessary unwrapping either” 
 
I wrote to Winkin asking about his work and he did not respond.  How easy is 
it to determine what is necessary and unnecessary? A lot is contextual and 
depends on what is at stake. The privacy of leaders seems of a different order 
than of those not in the public eye.    
 
I wrote to Winkin about the Goffman project – twice.  He did not reply.  It is 
possible that my messages did not reach him, but it is unlikely. 
 
That does not sound like much of an advice (how much unwrapping is too 
much?) for those wading through the muddy waters of biocritique.  Still, we 
should heed the common sense appeal to tact.  Be clear about your inquiry’s 
goal, highlight alternative interpretations, explore the potential sources of 
bias, consider the best and worst case scenarios,  
 
And also acknowledge the enduring tensions and tradeoffs.  
 
do as little harm as possible to the third parties, pay close attention to the 
historical circumstances and the ethical standards of the time – such are 
ethical guideposts I propose to follow in this biocritical inquiry.  We also need 
to bear in mind that biocritical accounts may reveal as much about the biocritic 
as about the object of biocritical investigation. 
 
13. 
A good example is Robert Erwin who provides this brief but telling account of 
his encounters with Goffman:  
 
        I base my opinion of Goffman’s personality on three conversations I had 
with him as a publisher between 1967 and 1979, on a couple of casual social 
encounters, and on stories told me by two friends and a person who dealt with 
him on academic business.   
        A number of people who knew him in person referred to him as sour and 
sardonic, although a minority objected to those labels.  The word I would use 
to characterize his personality is eerie. 
        During a year he spent at the Harvard Center for International Affairs, 
where I was then Editor of Publications, Goffman enrolled a child at the 
Cambridge school which one of my daughters was attending.   
        One sunny Saturday at a fund-raising fair at the school I discovered that 
the jazz quartet playing outside the Science Building included Edmond Hall, 
the superb Dixieland clarinetist.  Hall was old and down on his luck by the look 
of him, but he still had fasts fingers and a mahogany tone.   
        Goffman came ambling along while I was listening.  As we carried on 
small talk about the fair, the school, and our offspring, I nodded and beamed 
at the music, making no secret of my exultation and veneration.  The more 
enthusiasm I showed, the more Goffman looked at me with dread, and in a 
little while he left like a miner escaping from a tunnel that may collapse at any 
minute.   
        Maybe I was ingenuous.  Maybe he was tone deaf.  Yet I could not help 
but think of the Wicked Witch in the Wizard of Oz, the one who would melt if 
you splashed water at her.  Dread is not too strong a word for what I felt in 
him.  He seemed to fear that to be splattered with joy would be lethal. (Erwin 
2000:94)  
Good writing, I knew Bob in Cambridge and found him delightful. Yet I’d be 
careful about basing too much on such superficial data.  Re that one instant, a 
lot of other things might have been on his mind that he was pulled by, rather 
than being pushed by the music.  
 
He worked very hard and was serious about learning and I think about 
advancing his career (I don’t know how well he lived with the higher income 
he had from several sources (re his life style -- did he live beyond the usual 
faculty – since he clearly could of? I sensed a kind of social tenseness in him, 
not quite a quivering voice but close to it, he was deliberate, a good listener in 
the sense of using what you said/did for his own sardonic comments rather 
than as a deep response to what you had said directed to you and your 
needs.  Phrasing in the form of “people like you” “people of that ilk” come to 
mind, not sure if he said “like us” but he clearly included himself in some of 
the stigmatized categories.  
 
I agree that we need to use caution passing judgments on such episodes 
without knowing the entire context.  Erwin’s immersion into the music scene 
might have desensitized him to Goffman’s emotional needs, situational 
concerns.  Wish I had more than one account of this episode. 
14. 
 
As the work on the Erving Goffman Project lumbers along, it might be helpful 
to distinguish between (1) hearsay – tales about the person floating around 
without clear attribution; (2) anecdotes – stories traced to a particular source 
but not necessarily witnessed by the narrator; (3) episodes – single events 
witnessed by a narrator who did not play a major part in the encounter; 
(4)encounters – an interaction in which the narrator engaged in a focused 
interchange with the person in question; (5) transactions – a series of direct 
and indirect encounters stretching over a course of time and hinting at a 
pattern; (6) reputations – opinions about the person’s agency formed by 
specific narrators on the basis of personal observations, second hand 
accounts, and partial record; (7) evaluations – considered biocritical 
judgments about an embodied historical agent based on the personal 
accounts, institutional records, and other traces that the agent or a group of 
agents left behind.  We might also need a term like biographical 
repertories to describe a range of biographical blueprints that gain currency 
in a historical group, strata, society, or era.  The notion of “biographem” 
deployed by Winkin (1999) suggests additional lines for biocritical 
investigation.  A specific tale may not fall squarely into either category, 
spanning several framing models at once, but the above schema might help 
assess its general thrust.   
 
Great set of concepts, you should elaborate on these in your paper, -- expand 
with examples. Do you know my essay on means of finding dirty data, 
(http://web.mit.edu/gtmarx/www/dirty.html).  I think a lot about these things, 
but more in trying to figure out what is truth of various kinds, the nature of 
knowledge, how does the positivist’s knowledge connect to other kinds of 
knowing etc.  I do this pretty seat of the pants not from much knowledge (yet) 
of the deeper literatures.  I will try to connect your comments here to a 
chapter on types of personal data for my surveillance project. 
 
Will supply examples in time and see how much testimony falls into each 
category.   
 
The would-be contributors to the Erving Goffman Project who witnessed Erving 
personally and have a tale to share can shed light on his physical appearance 
(e.g., estimates of Erving’s heights range between 5.2 and 5.6), his demeanor 
(e.g., his eagerness to reveal the other’s and conceal his own backstage), 
manner of dress (e.g., some remember him as a dapper, deliberate dresser 
while others recall him being casual about his clothes), as well as specific 
deeds that show the widest possible range of his enselfments (e.g., is the 
story about Goffman’s pointing to the inferiority of female grad student 
apocryphal?).   
 
I am sure he was under 5.6 since he seemed short to me but he was 
graceful.  I don’t recall ever seeing him in a tie but he was not a slob 
either.  He did indicate to me that some concessions had to be made –I think 
he said he didn’t much like to shave but he did on those occasions requiring it, 
also re being a drop-out California fun seeker in the scenes John Irwin wrote 
about, Goffman said that was great  but you couldn’t do it forever, not after 
age 30 anyway.  I think the point here wasn’t about needing a real job, but 
more that you would look silly.  Well if we know about social construction etc., 
why should the well-put-together smart person care what it looks like to 
others, why not be subversive, not to shock but to be “true” to yourself? So 
that comment perhaps suggests his commitment to the middle class values he 
could also mock so well.  He seemed to be saying that even role distance had 
to be within appropriate bounds/bonds or else it didn’t work. Knowing how to 





As Dean MacCannell put it, “Goffman was both friendly, modest, and 
considerate – and he could be mean as hell” (MacCannell 2007).  
 
I never saw any personal meanness.  I did a few times sense his impatience 
and I did not appreciate the almost total lack of comments on my paper and 
the B plus grade as I recall, even though he cited in his Stigma and I think I 
got an A on his final. I think he gave me a B+ for the class and that seemed 
wrong, but it never occurred to me to ask why or to argue.   
 
I hope to write about Goffman and his students some days.  Would be 
interesting to learn your impressions about Goffman the lecturer.  I have 
collected some interesting and inconsistent testimonies on that score. 
 
He was the most interesting teacher I have ever had. He taught by his content 




People who knew Goffman well have sought to reconcile such contradictory 
strands in Goffman’s enselfments and explain their admiration for the 
man.  Says John Irwin, “Even though Erving could be a pain in the ass and 
sometimes cruel, my wife and I loved him because he was so smart, 
fascinating, entertaining, and occasionally kind” (Irwin, 2007).  Gary Marx 
invokes the image of “at least two Goffmans.  One was wise, warm, and of 
good humor, eager to impart knowledge via morality tales and specific advice 
and make the student feel like he or she was within the chosen circle of person 
in the know.  .  .  .  The other Goffman was controlled, insensitive, and 
indifferent and made sure the student knew his place.  Most of the ‘Tales of 
Goffman’ are negative.  In many of his dealings with others he did not reflect 
the sensitivity and concern for the underdog shown in his early written work” 
(Marx 2000:67).  John Lofland captures “dialectical contradictions” in 
Goffman’s presentation of self especially well: 
He was a severe formal theorist yet a descriptive ethnographer; a reclusive 
scholar yet an adroit administrator and a rapier-witted party-goer; cynical yet 
sincere; an intellectual giant yet skeptical about his achievements; openly 
crass in promoting his self-interest yet rejecting broad and public self-
promotion; brilliant at ferreting out social bluffs yet less than adept at bluffing; 
religious about scholarship yet cynical about social enterprises.  Most certainly 
he stripped away polite fictions in print and in person, yet also in print and in 
person had the deepest and most profound appreciation of the importance of 
‘tact, graciousness, and compassion” (Lofland 2000:176). 
This part I think was central and the dialects from his personal marginality and 
novelists/human’s ability to imagine helped with his insights. I don’t know 
about his adroit administrator part, he seemed to avoid committees etc by 




How could a scholar speaking so eloquently about the cruel way society 
stigmatizes its members tell a female student that “he did not think women 
should be in graduate school” or pointedly use derogatory terms like “gimps” 
when “there was a badly crippled woman in the class” (Marx 2000:67).  Notice 
that it was the same Goffman who published pioneering studies 
like Stigma (1963), “The Arrangements between the Sexes” (1977), 
and Gender Advertisements (1979).  It is hard to think Goffman was unaware 
of how his speech acts must have affected the people he stigmatized. Then, 
what was the pedagogical meaning of his harangues? 
 
Maybe he couldn’t so easily always control them, there needn’t always be a 
method behind the madness. 
 
Or consider a report about Goffman passing through a hotel lobby at a 
sociology convention and casually remarking to a group of friends: “’If I can’t 
find anybody more important to talk with, I’ll come back and talk with you’.  A 
jaunty terrorist with a diffident voice reminding us that in this world’s bag full-
to-bursting with banal sentiment,” 
 
This could also be a sign of respect – you mattered enough to be able to share 
in his cleverness and honesty to confront sacred animals.  We all know that 
opportunistic climbing sentiment, even as it gets suppressed.  I would take it 
in an appreciative way if he said that to me.  The issue is would he have said it 
to Merton or Blumer? I bet not, so in saying it he is acknowledging that we in 
a sense can be trusted because we are at or below him and he can be honest 
with us.  This may hurt because it says we are lower, but also may flatter 
because it says he is honest and we know what he is expressing and he knows 
that we know. 
 
observes Bennett Berger (2000:279), “anybody who says something cruel and 
true can’t be all bad.” 
 
Yet these 2 are linked in delicate ways and as he knew there are times when it 
is better to be false and kind. 
 
The issues of power are powerfully implicated in Erving’s conduct, as they are 




Here is one more example illuminating the persistent self-referentiality in 
Goffman’s conduct.  It comes from Goffman’s “lecture about lecture” delivered 
at the University of Michigan in 1976 where he mocked a typical lecturer who 
“in exchange for this song and dance, this stage-limited performance of 
approachability, this illusion of personal access . . . gets honor, attention, 
applause and a fee.  For which I thank you” (Goffman 1983c:194).  
 
I don’t get this one, once in awhile there is a big gap and it is a ritual and 
empty.  But the best academic presentations (especially in a small group, or if 
a large one, involving those deeply knowledgeable or at least interested), it 
needn’t be an illusion since there are sincere and helpful exchanges which can 
go on, there is personal access re future meetings, advice, footnotes etc. and 
the honor is very modest.  Perhaps he exaggerates to make the point about 
how there is a ritual presentational quality to it but there is so much more (or 
can be).  So in a way this is a cheap shot kind of remark and his own work 
ethos undercuts it.  Can the same be said for publishing an article?  
 
Just about any interaction can be viewed from the vantage point of impression 
management, just about every situation can morph into a staged performance 
requiring a dramaturgical analysis.  This applies to lectures and lecturing.  The 
important thing is that Erving perceived himself under those circumstances as 




Also, there is probably a sampling bias in all memoir literature that tends to 
focus on the spectacular, the offbeat, and the negative and underreport the 
routine, the mundane, and the benign.  Here is a recollection by David 
Dickens, 2008) that shows Goffman’s different sides: 
During my last year of graduate school, in 1977 or 1978, I presented a paper 
on phenomenological sociology at a conference in Boston.  The session was 
chaired by Larry Wieder, a prominent ethnomethodologist.  Once the 
presentations concluded, a small unassuming man walked up to me, shook my 
hand and told me “I really enjoyed your paper.  It was very clear.” I thanked 
him and he then turned toward Larry, whom he seemed to know, and said 
“Larry, I didn’t understand a word you said.” Wieder, being the kind fellow that 
he was, simply chuckled and said, “Well, Erving, I’m sorry to hear that.” I still 
had no idea who the stranger was but, as he turned and walked away, Larry 
looked at me and said, “you should be very proud, that was Erving Goffman.”  
 
But this goes in the right direction re the weak and the strong, unlike some of 
his other stuff.  In those early years most of the students I knew had trouble 
making sense of ethno-methodology, even when they were sympathetic to 
symbolic interaction.  
 
This story also fits with his not wearing a name tag at professional meetings. 
His failure to introduce himself in the story above could be seen as humility 
and wanting to put the emphasis on the student’s paper or as arrogance, just 
assuming that everyone would know who he was and people as famous as 
himself had no need to introduce themselves.  
 
I agree.  Wish I had more episodes of this kind to see how they are distributed 
in Erving’s self-production. 
20. 
As this example shows, Goffman could be supportive and dismissive at the 
same time.  And he clearly showed the capacity for growth, both intellectually 
and personally.  Goffman might have been skeptical about women’s work in 
graduate school at the early stages of his career but later wrote papers on 
gender discrimination and institutional reflexivity, which must have been 
prompted in part by his reflections on his own role as a professor in the 
academe dominated by males.  He castigated mental institutions for the 
abusive treatment they gave their charges, following which he wrote a 
powerful account of what it is like to live with a disturbed person prone to 
violating the interaction order.  He pretty much ignored the role of the body in 
his early writings, notably in The Presentation of Self, then spoke eloquently 
about the pervasive effect that our bodily limitations and affective 
disturbances have on our conduct.  We might take these metamorphoses as a 
warning against the tendency to cherry pick evidence that accords with certain 
preconceptions and gloss over human agency’s inchoate properties.  Human 
agency is a stochastic phenomena marked by indeterminacy and 
contradiction.  
 
Yes but also by lots of consistency and predictability, especially over groups 
and aggregates, need to contextualize to note where have more or less of this, 
one of my areas is the sociology of surprise but that is partly possible because 
there is so much that isn’t a surprise. 
 
Yes, there is a dialectics of continuity and discontinuity.  The question is what 
we designate as a figure here and what relegate to the background.   
 
Still, when I hear about the “hazing” to which Goffman subjected those close 
to him (Lofland 2000:167; Scheff 2006:11), I cannot help thinking that such 
episodes are too numerous to ignore, especially when they concern a student-
teacher relationship.  When we profess we impart knowledge not only via 
discourse but also viscerally, through our embodied actions which provide a 
somatic-affective backdrop against which our professed theoretical 
commitments loom larger or smaller.  That applies not only to Erving Goffman 
whose deeds and theories reveal a certain thematic (dis)continuity, but to all 
of us who aspire to profess and who, often in spite of ourselves, serve as vital 
links in the long semiotic chains of history.  Goffman’s abiding commitment to 
scholarship, seriousness of his intellectual pursuits, willingness to work closely 
with aspiring scholars are of signal importance 
 
There was not a lot of this that I saw. He had very few PhD students, what 
does that say? A great quote about this in the book Genius that I will track 
down and send you about the physicist Richard Feynman’s lack of students. 
 
This may be meaningful.  I would like to compile a list of Goffman’s grad 
students and see if there is any pattern. 
 
but so are the occasions where he exhibited a remarkable lack of emotional 
intelligence as evidenced by the tears to which he reduced his charges and 
humiliations he caused to those close to him. 
 
21. 
Goffman’s relationships with his students deserve a special attention.  In many 
cases, it seems, these relationships were marred by strain and ill-feelings.  All 
teacher-apprentice bonds have the potential to be fragile on account of the 
inevitable status disparity, signal crossing, only partially fulfilled 
promises.  Still, the number of Goffman’s students regaling their ambivalence 
and misgivings about the master seems unusually high.  
 
But the number writing about him relative to others is also high. The issue is 
within those who comment does he get a higher proportion of such stories? 
 
That is one of the tasks to be undertaken. 
22. 
Tom Scheff, who notes that “as teacher and mentor, Goffman was generous 
and helpful,” tells about his disappointment when he travelled some distance 
to consult Goffman on his project only to be dismissed in a rather summary 
fashion – “he cut me off abruptly after hearing only a few minutes of my 
observation and confusion” (Scheff 2006:8-13).  Joel Best (2007) recalls how 
he went to Goffman’s office to inquire about the project he tried to model on 
his teacher’s writing “in a sense that it had examples from fiction, newspaper 
articles, and so on . . . and he gave me a B+ on the paper.  He told me, ‘It is 
really hard to do that kind of thing well.’ And that was about all the advice I 
ever got from him.”  John Irwin (2007) recounts a similar story about a paper 
he turned over to Goffman who” coldly informed me that he would not work 
with me on a PhD. . . .   I didn’t have much contact with Goffman for the next 
two years.  When I put together a group of professors to serve as my orals’ 
committee, which had to pass on my mastery of several chosen areas of 
sociology before I could go on to my last task, the dissertation, I purposely left 
him off because I heard he gave one of the other graduate students I knew a 
lot of trouble during his orals.”  
I am pretty sure this was me, I remember talking a lot to John (who came a 
few years after I did) about my graduate experiences. I don’t recall Goffman 
giving me a lot of trouble, but I do recall he took it all very seriously and 
pushed me. It took the committee a long time to decide my case. I was 
outside nervously waiting.  S.M. Lipset came out and said something like, 
“congratulations you passed with distinction.” Lipset said it took awhile 
because they were trying to decide whether I had passed with distinction. I 
assume since Lipset was my main advisor then, having given me my ma data 
on Father Coughlin and Neil Smelser later praised that Goffman was less 
enthusiastic, but I don’t know. I then took off for a year of round the world 
travel and received an NIMH grant with him as my sponsor for the following 
year. But I let that go because of an offer that seemed much more appealing 
(this involved a full time job and a study more related to social issues). I didn’t 
see him much the next year, but we did meet at least once. The next year he 
was at Harvard for the year and then he moved to Penn. 
One thing I would dearly like to do in the Goffman project is to track the same 
event(s) as they are reflected in different accounts.  The Goffman project is 
designed in part to examine how real time events grow into narrative facts and 
how biographical narratives deploy and transcend the conventions of the 
time.  Fleeting impressions, second-hand accounts, and comments on other 
people’s comments are equally valuable in this respect, for they can be cross-
referenced and checked against each other.  
23. 
 
Recalling “the fight with Goffman” that he and Sacks carried on and that some 
might have mistaken for the oedipal urge to slay one’s intellectual father, 
Schegloff observes that the animus was coming from the other end:  “It was 
Sacks, actually, who remarked once that we nowadays think of Oedipus story 
as a story about patricide, but that it was in the first instance, of course, a 
case of intended infanticide .  .  .  it was his father who first left Oedipus to 
die, and not the other way around” (Schegloff 1988:91).  This story had a 
characteristic twist.  When asked if Sacks was his student, Goffman once 
allegedly answered:  “‘What do you mean; I was his student!’” (Schegloff 
1992:xxiii).  This episode is indicative of Goffman’s ability to shift shapes 
without the willingness to explain himself, to connect his past and present 
enselfments and square off with the ethical implications of his deeds.  Goffman 
will not be contained; whatever frame he was about to impose on the situation 
and himself, he would find the way to undercut it at one point or another.   
 
In this setting where he has the power there is also an aspect of playing, 
teasing, hiding.  But that won’t be contained thing is also an attribute of those 
we find “interesting” or “a character” or a “live wire” could also be for someone 
who is easily bored because he is so smart and insightful and needs to play 
and confound to keep himself amused, as well as perhaps sometimes as a 
pedagogical tool.  I recall sometime connecting him to the problems of those 
who are so much smarter or quicker and more insightful than others, there is 
a kind of impatience with the slow and less wise that can re responded too 
with role distancing by the superior party and with humor and also by 
challenging them  by doing something not expected. 
 
The quick-witted might be annoying to those around.  Perhaps Goffman used 
to single out such students and treat them differently.  He was a smart aleck 
himself, according to Hughes.  There was not much interaction between 
Hughes and Goffman after the latter’s defense.  Goffman avoided citing his 
teachers.  Only later on in life Goffman acknowledged his teacher’s influence in 
a personal letter (see Jaworski’s article on the subject posted in the 




Perhaps the boldest interpretation of Goffman’s conduct comes from Dean 
MacCannell who reads Goffman’s life as a deliberate effort to combat bad faith 
that Sartre decried in his existentialist philosophy: 
 
Not sure how you fight bad faith by asserting it – unless it is to offer examples 
that encourage self-reflection and bring insight by shattering the taken-for-
granted. His analysis and writing can be seen partly as pleas for authenticity 
and honesty and as stressing the importance of respecting the dignity of the 
person and not exploiting others or engaging in anti-community actions for 
self-serving ends. Somewhere he wrote that the first norm was to be what you 
appear to be (or perhaps he put it more softly as a universal expectation). A 
lot of his work dealt with deviations from this and responses to it. His brilliant 
insights and vision saw more often than most persons the gap between verbal 
and other presentations and the “reality” within back stage scenes and 
personal masks. Given what we know of power, stratification and culture this 
was more likely to show up the more privileged and hence is a blow for the 
good guys.  His insights into gender images is the best example, but Stigma 
has many as well. 
 
But I don’t see how some of the “tales of Goffman” re his behavior were 
fighting this good fight. 
 
How does one combat it rather than encouraging it by behaving badly or 
counter to the norms?  To be honest and direct and not hide perhaps counters 
it, but some of his other behaviors seem to involve bad faith.  You could count 
up all the behavioral examples you have found and categorize those and see 
where they fit re the above and other categories. 
 
I agree – fighting bad faith with bad faith may perpetuate bad faith rather 
than expose and undercut it.  At the same time, I see why this strategy has 
been deployed by agents in particular historical circumstances.   
 
If we list the various claims (both substantiated and the other kind) that have 
been made against Goffman – cynical, ironical, duplicitous, deceptive, 
unserious, nonresponsive – we find they are also the key terms in Sartre’s 
analysis of ‘bad faith’.  It seems that Goffman took Sartre so much to heart 
that he assembled a persona for himself exactly on the model of ‘Sartrean bad 
faith’, perhaps in the belief that a double negative makes a positive, that is, if 
he could only mock up bad faith maybe he, at least, could escape the 
determinism he describes so well.  Certainly there is evidence in his 
comportment that Goffman was more concerned than anyone else about the 




Goffman’s research agenda could have been influenced by his struggle to 
assert his dignity, move up in the social hierarchy, overcome the stigmatizing 
experience of his childhood and youth (consider in this context his remark to 
Dell Hymes).  Hence, his preoccupation with appearances, stigmatization, and 
passing persisting throughout his intellectual career, as well as the impostor 
complex ingrained in his dramaturgical preoccupation with the con artists’ 
craft.   
 
Really are at least two pieces here.  First as a kind of living testimony to 
injustice and unfairness and pretense and second simply as a strategy to get 
ahead by fitting into showing role-nearness rather than distance. Don’t stand 
out, to get along go along, don’t rock the boat.  
 
I paid close attention to Goffman’s first major article, the one on the symbols 
of class status.  I feel it illuminates his early interest in climbing and passing 
that can be connected with his biography, even though he preferred not to 
tackle head-on the issues of class in his subsequent works.     
 
None of these explanations is self-evident, neither excludes the others, yet 




The impression that Kohn and his colleagues at the Institute of Mental Health 
formed at the time was that this separation had to do with marital 
difficulties.  Kohn is careful to problematize his conclusions, pointing out that 
his information came to him second-hand:  “We all assumed this [the fact that 
his wife did not at first join Goffman at Berkeley] had to do with the strain in 
their marriage.  We might have learned this from people who knew both of 
them better.  But I knew of nothing [in particular].  She did not have a 
job.  My assumption might have been informed by those who knew the 
situation.”   
 
This is ok as a broad observation on the irony etc., but the timing and 
circumstances seem off.  The de-institutionalization movement I think came 
only later.  Also as a rich person she would likely have been in private 
institutions and able to come and go at will unlike those turned out onto the 
streets from public hospitals a bit later 
 
That is a worthy resource and I should probably look into it.  If you know how 
to go about it or how to contract Charlie Glock, please let me know.  Goffman’ 
interest in mental institutions interfaces with his wife’s mental issues and 
experiences with psychiatry.  That mush seems clear.  The exact nature of this 




The impression management technique focuses on the qualities amenable to 
semiotic control, susceptible to simulation and dissimulation.  
 
Great ambiguous terms. I have written on this and would be interested in how 
you approach it. This ties to the ambiguity of language and the fact that while 
just about everything is a social construction and partial, that doesn’t mean it 
is all fake or fake in the same ways when it is and that of course has social 
causes and consequences. 
 
I discuss the relationship between simulation and dissimulation in my ST 
article “Signing in the Flesh” (it is posted in the Intercyberlibrary).   My 
position is that every act of simulation involves dissimulation and vice versa.  I 
have proposed the notion of “dissimulacrum” to complement the more familiar 
“simulacrum.”  The thrust of this discussion is directed against the 
postmodernist contention that we can never get a hold of “presence,” that all 
we can witness is “absence.”  My suggestion was that postmodernist gloss 
over the pesky corporealites and affective disturbances driving their 
imagination.   
 
Semiotic resources of the body are vast indeed, but they are not limitless.  Not 
all body indicia can be stage-managed.  You cannot sit at the piano for an 
improvisation, take a bar exam on the fly, stand your ground in a dog fight, or 
argue gracefully in a high-stake debate – unless you have the right stuff, the 
hard-acquired habitus.  The ceremonial skills we deploy at a wedding will not 
get us far in the operating room or on a dance floor.  Talking the talk is one 
thing, walking the walk is another, and rocking the rock is something else 
altogether.  You can fake an orgasm, but it is hard to simulate a hard-on, or 
dissimulate it, for that matter.  Much of our life is embodied, substantive, and 
instrumental in a way that anonymous encounters in the elevator or chance 




Goffman’s works are replete with the observations that presuppose Goffman’s 
exposure to the relevant experience or vouch for his willingness to trust his 
contemporaries to supply the meaning of the reported activity.  However, the 
exact source of Goffman’s knowledge about the “real thing” and the “faked 
one” and the empirical indicators thereof are rarely spelled out.   
 
This gets to my opening comment, the assumption of a shared culture and set 
of experiences, but it also makes me wonder why persons are drawn to 
Goffman (or what separates those who are from those who aren’t). A 
worthwhile paper lies in analyzing Goffman’s legacy through those he 
influenced.  In my book on surveillance which I will send some of, I frame it 
around a number of his information control concerns updated to the cyberage. 
 
Why am I drawn to Goffman’s life and work?  There must be reasons for that, 
implicating my own embodied existence.  I remember discovering Goffman in 
my college years, reading the Presentation of Self, writing a paper on Russian 
culture inspired in part by Goffman’s ideas.  With its tradition of Potemkin 
portable villages, USSR seemed like a perfect terrain for dramaturgical 
analysis.  I can list several possible connections between Goffman’s theories 
and my own biography:  (a) Goffman’s parents emigrated from Russia, and so 
did I; (b) Goffman is given to mocking and sarcasm common in Russian 
intellectuals, a pattern I interpret as a response to an abusive environment 
with which I am all too familiar; (c) the ambivalent tales regaled by Goffman’s 
students resonate with my own experience; (d) I can identify with Goffman’s 
efforts to transcend the formative conditions of his age, to shed the habits 
informed by the narrow perspective of the era.  Other parallels can be drawn 
here, no doubt.  The list is not exhaustive, nor can it be exhausted in 
principle.  Anything I can say about the reasons and motives driving my 
inquiry is problematic.  (Isn’t it why you cannot fully psychoanalyze 
yourself?).  The process is inevitably open-ended, yielding new insights when 
performed by different biocritics.  The very process of inventing the terms and 




Displaying requisite selves, protecting other people’s faces, maintaining proper 
affect, remedying situational infractions – there is hardly an interaction ritual 
that Goffman would not violate when the opportunity presented itself.  This is 
not to say that the interaction order is a figment of our imagination, only that 
it is indefinitely flexible and that its power to constrain is perennially 
problematic.  It is less of a ceremony than a semi-chaotic order that keeps 
emerging in feats and starts without ever solidifying into a reality sui generis.   
 
Yes but… seems too strong for me, depends on type and context --some are 
wide open, others highly contained and some in between. People vary in their 
styles apart from context. We sometimes say there is a bad fit etc or you are 
just right for that task, implying the perfect merge. Studying collective 
behavior earlier in my career helped with these issues, (e.g., especially the 
first chapter of a collective behavior book --
 http://web.mit.edu/gtmarx/www/cbchap1.html 
 
Yes, the degrees of orderliness vary from one social domain to another, but 
there is hardly a realm where a measure of indeterminacy and an element of 
ad hocing are present.   
 
Goffman’s theory of interaction order glosses over the formal and 
explicit issues of power which inform much of our interactive strategies.  
 
But a lot is there by indirection.  
 
The insights Goffman has to offer are personal; they are sifted through the 
affective filter that informs his ethnographic sensibilities and colors his 
conceptual innovations.  While such insights may be biased and thus need to 
be corrected, they often have a visceral truth to them that owes much to 
Goffman’s willingness to insert himself into the hermeneutical circle and allow 




But this is hidden. There is rarely an “I” in his work, that could be another 
easy to do computer project ala the methods used by those who analyze 
Shakespeare word patterns. 
 
Goffman’s theories elide certain emotions in part because he had troubles 
experiencing particular affective states.  If his formulations sometimes evince 
the uneasiness about the bodily dimension of social interaction, it is in part 
because he felt ambivalent about his own corporeal dimensions and embodied 
qualities.  
 
Don’t we all? This is partly why people resonate so with some of his work, 
even those who don’t know from sociology. I also think his imaginative 
empathy suggests undercuts the suggestion that he had affective issues. I 
would keep observable behavioral expressions distinct from what the actor 
may experience.  
 
True, but our ambivalence manifests itself in a drastically different 
manner.  Some people maintain stoic impenetrability, others get hot under the 
color, still others dissimulate.   
 
As several commentators point out, Goffman’s take on stigmatized agency 
implicated his own embodied being.  A master of ceremony, Goffman felt more 
comfortable communicating the niceties of social etiquette and expressive 
behavior than articulating the substantive, exchange-based transactions in 
which social life is grounded and which serve as a check on our expressive 
claims.  
 
For example consider…  
 
Conartistry can get us only that far.  The expressive costume we don must 
meet the requirements of the place but it also must fit our biosocial physic, 




The Durkheimean insistence on social reality as a phenomenon sui generis is 
partially to blame for this weakness.  This emphasis played a crucial role in 
circumscribing sociology as a separate disincline, but policing its borderlines 
and fending off the encroachment from neighboring disciplines like biology, 
physiology, psychology, and psychiatry had an unintended consequence of 
delimiting the scope of sociological investigation and discouraging 
interdisciplinary research.  No doubt society informs the somatic-affective 
phenomena, but its reach is powerfully checked by the corporeal and 
neurological resources of the body that cannot be dramatized away and that 
shape social dynamics according to the logic of their own.  When psychic 
events come to our attention, we should not assume that they are necessarily 
psycho-logical.  By the same token, social phenomena are not automatically 
and exclusively socio-logical.  The bio-social continuum calls for an analysis 
that undermines the bureaucratic imperative of adhering to the disciplinary 
logic sui generis.   
 
Very very important and a next big need for advances in understanding, the 
interaction of these factors.  I see it a lot of this in work on surveillance 
technology, with the silly battles between techno and social 
determinists.  There is some useful work in the social studies of science that 
tries to integrate.  In writing about the engineering of control it also is 
present.  The physical and natural worlds (beyond the bio) need more 
presence in social understanding.  Your example of the distended male 
member works well (although I would have written erection instead) and no 
amount of presentational aplomb will alter the different starting points for 
most males and females, to stay nothing of the powers of gravity! 
 
The whole division into social sciences and corresponding academic 
departments must be problematized.  Each field proceeds on certain discipline-
constituting assumptions and operations that the practitioners use to abstract 
from practical manifold – the buzzing confusion of experience, as James put 
it.  The result is the compartmentalization of social sciences, each one staking 
claims on a particular “reality” and vigorously policing its borders.  Yet there is 
no socio-logical reality that is not at the same time psycho-logical, no psycho-
logical phenomena free from the imprint of politics, no political events devoid 
of economic influence, and so on.  The bureaucratic logic sui generis favors 
splitting the humpty-dumpty into as many academically certified fields and 
pieces as possible.  I am looking for the interdisciplinary logic that brings the 
humpty-dumpty together again.  
  
 
